In this letter, Ustad Mohammad Ali Talpur responds to Hazaran Baloch, tracing the moral and political stakes of remembrance and resistance in the Baloch struggle. He foregrounds the legacy of the Baloch nation, where mourning and honoring martyrs binds generations, and encourages his pupil to trust in the unflinching nature and will of the Baloch people—traits that have triumphed in the face of 77 years of injustice. THE VERTICAL Letter to History (II) In this letter, Ustad Mohammad Ali Talpur responds to Hazaran Baloch, tracing the moral and political stakes of remembrance and resistance in the Baloch struggle. He foregrounds the legacy of the Baloch nation, where mourning and honoring martyrs binds generations, and encourages his pupil to trust in the unflinching nature and will of the Baloch people—traits that have triumphed in the face of 77 years of injustice. VOL. 2 LETTER AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Iman Iftikhar Talpur Sahab (2025) Digital Illustration ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Iman Iftikhar Talpur Sahab (2025) Digital Illustration SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Letter Balochistan 9th Apr 2025 Letter Balochistan Pakistan Activism Enforced Disappearances State Violence Protests Liberation Journalism Revolution Martyr Grief Sammi Deen Baloch Mahrang Baloch Resistance History Violence Writing After Loss Dissidence Disappearance Baloch Yakjehti Committee Dr Mahrang Baloch Arrests Tum Marogy Hum Niklengy Militarism Leadership Mass Graves Assassination Imprisonment Armed Struggle Repression State Repression Oppression Defiance Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur Sarri Sacred Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. My Dearest Daughter, Hazaran, Your anguished letter made me cry tears of rage, anger, and sadness. They cut deeper into the scars that remain on my soul after witnessing the suffering of our people for over half a century. Having lost so many of my friends and former students, I wonder if these wounds will ever heal. I remember Lawang Khan , seventy years old, who died defending his village in 1973. I remember Ali Mohammad Mengal , a veteran from 1960. I remember Safar Khan Zarakzai who, when surrounded and asked to surrender, replied: This is my land; I will defend it with my life. He died fighting. Etched on my soul are the enforced disappearances of my dearest friends, Duleep Dass “Dali” and Sher Ali Marri, in the spring of 1976. Dali nursed me back to health when I lay injured in the mountains. Etched, too, is the suffering of Baloch families I witnessed living as refugees in Afghanistan—only to be identified as terrorists upon their return. So many unsung heroes, so many disappeared without a trace, so many lives uprooted. They found no peace, neither in exile, nor upon return. My spiritual association with the Baloch struggle began on 15 July 1960, when Nawab Nauroz Khan’s son, Batay Khan, along with six companions––Sabzal Khan Zehri, Bahawal Khan Musiyani, Wali Muhammad Zarakzai, Ghulam Rasool Nichari, Masti Khan Musiyani, and Jamal Khan Zehri—were executed after the state broke its promise of amnesty. Four were hanged in Hyderabad Jail. Three, including Batay Khan, in Sukkur Jail. It was my uncle, Mir Rasool Bakhsh Talpur, who claimed their bodies, performed the funeral rites, and brought them to Kalat. On 21 October 1971, I left home and joined the armed struggle in the Marri hills. I was fuelled by rage. You ask what bullets sound like when they tear through our bodies. I thought of the twenty-seven fired into Sangat Sana , the three that pierced Jalil Reki ’s heart, the one that struck Ali Sher Kurd ’s forehead. Those martyrs may not have heard them, but those sounds echo in the soul of every Baloch who loves the motherland. You mention the screeching chains as they dragged my precious Mahrang away, shamelessly calling it arrest; her sarri/سری/chador trampled by those abducting her. You ask me about the thunder that must have shaken the heavens when my dearest Sammi’s سری was snatched from her head to dehumanize and humiliate her. All this and more is forever seared into me. Let me tell you what a sarri means to the Baloch. Fights cease when our women, with sarris in hand, come in-between. The Baloch say: the sarri is sacred. Our poet Atta Shad said that in return for a bowl of water, we give a hundred years of loyalty. I wish he had also said that the desecration of the sarri is never forgiven. Not in a thousand generations. It was difficult when I first joined the struggle. Despite the pain, however, there was also the belief that eventual victory would come. I, too, closed the door of hopelessness because I knew we were sowing seeds that would one day grow into trees—providing shade and fruit to all. When Banuk Karima was taken from us, it left the nation mourning. Her death created a void which seemed impossible to fill. Then came Mahrang, Sammi, Sabiha, Beebow, and hundreds more. Karima lit a fire in the hearts of Baloch women to participate in the national struggle––she embodied the wisdom and courage I see in all of you. When asked what Banuk Karima meant to Balochistan and its struggle, I replied: Karima is the conscience and the consciousness of the Baloch Nation . You ask me about little Kambar, Zahid’s son, who has lost another father this cursed March. I cannot send him words of consolation; they would be meaningless. But I want him to know that this isn’t his injustice to bear alone. The Baloch Nation will remember. You ask me about the state’s inhumanity toward Bebarg, who lives his life as a paraplegic. Why does the state fear a person who is unable to walk? It fears his voice. That is how the state maintains control: by repressing Baloch voices. My dearest child, it is of utmost importance to understand the essence of this state. It is by nature predatory and extractive––it cannot expand without exploiting us and our words, which refuse to submit to its evil design. We should not expect humanity or compassion from political parties integral to the establishment. They work for each other and protect their own interests. All pillars of the state are complicit. And in general, the silence of society is deafening too. The state will continue repressing us. What we do in response is our responsibility. Our only avenue is resistance. If we give it up, repression will be manifold, as docile people are an easier target. You rightly stated that Mahrang and Sammi taught the Baloch that they must stop being forever mourners, forever betrayed—and for that, they are considered the greatest threat and have been jailed. You are rightly worried about the fact that the new voices of our movement are now in jail cells, and that the state is trying to terrify young girls from treading the path that Karima, Mahrang, and Sammi chose. I feel it is important to understand how our Baloch Nation has responded to this unending crisis. Today, on the streets of Balochistan, girls—some as young as five years old—are carrying pictures of Karima, Mahrang, and Sammi. They are not merely holding their images; they picture themselves as these icons, and that is where our hope lies. For tomorrow, there will be Karimas, Mahrangs, Sammis, Sabihas, and Beebows in the millions. No power on earth will be able to stop them. I am not waiting for that tomorrow—it has already begun. The bastions of tyranny are crumbling, and that is why repression has multiplied and spread. That is why Mahrang and Sammi have been imprisoned. And while this violence will continue, it cannot subdue our spirits. “ Pakistan Zindabad ” was knifed onto the bodies of those Baloch who were extrajudicially killed. Their eyes gouged, their bodies drilled. Did the resistance vaporize and vanish? No. During the 2013 Long March by Mama Qadeer Baloch, Farzana Majeed, and others, faces were covered to avoid recognition. Today, thousands come out fearlessly to protest. The Baloch Nation has become fearless. The only history with a limited shelf life is that of the oppressor. Our history is ineradicable and can only flourish—for victory is our destiny. You ask if writing is futile. No, my dearest daughter, writing is our weapon. And it is a weapon that terrifies the oppressor because the word of freedom is sacred—it enlightens and motivates. Why do they seize books Baloch put up at book fairs? Writing challenges their phony and misleading discourse. Keep writing. You are empowering the Baloch narrative and preserving the history of Baloch resistance—a history long subjected to suppression. Writing strikes fear into the hearts and minds of oppressors in a way that no other weapon can. While other weapons bring only death and destruction, writing gives life—and that is why they fear words so deeply. Future generations will thank you and honor you for your words. You also ask, “Who will stand with us?’ and “Is it possible that the other oppressed nations of this land will stand with us in defiance of a shared oppressor?” My respected daughter, I believe that unity arises from two sources: either from the pain people share, or from a collective consciousness shaped by shared aspirations, history, and naturally, pain. Expecting support from those who believe in the narratives taught in Pakistan Studies is futile. And yes, do not expect the world to come to our aid—it has allowed Israel to do whatever it pleases to the Palestinians. The people may raise their voices, but governments will remain silent—because speaking up would endanger the very systems of brutality and exploitation they rely on. Merely being oppressed does not automatically give someone the consciousness to feel the pain of others or to support them. There are millions of oppressed people here, but support cannot be expected from them in the same way it can be from those who share our collective pain. To obstruct the path of collective consciousness, the state abducts students, blocks book fairs, and systematically neglects the education sector—ensuring that not many Baloch become educated. This denial of education is a key part of a calculated policy of erasure. Through their indiscriminate repression, however, they are unknowingly forging our collective consciousness. This will be the very reason for their downfall. You have talked about our mourning and grief over the years and how it continues. Yes, when there is death, there is grief and mourning—but it has not only been that. When my dearest friend Raza Jehangir was killed on 14 August 2013 by the state, we honored his death. His brave mother led the funeral and they sang a lullaby: Raza jan is little (child) and innocent, joyfully asleep in the decorated cradle. Joyfully asleep in the decorated cradle, sapient (learned men) are his forefathers. Then there is the incredible picture of the wife of Banzay Pirdadani Marri, who stands at the graves of her two sons, Mohammad Khan and Mohammad Nabi, draped in the flag that symbolizes a free Balochistan. They were killed on the same day and their bodies thrown on the roadside. I treated the two boys once, when they were very young and sick. When they grew up, I taught them at the school I managed for our refugee children in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan. How could my soul feel peace after their death? Yet I know that despite the depth of pain caused by the loss and disappearance of loved ones, the Baloch have mourned with grace and dignity. They cannot be accused of selling their grief. Those in power have offered compensation to the families of the disappeared, but these offers have always been firmly rejected. In the end, you ask, “Tell me, Baba Jan, are we destined to be forever caught in this storm, forever erased, forever replaced?” This storm—or the ones that came before—could not erase us, nor replace us, and neither will the ones that may come in the future. Why do I say this? Because the storm that came on 27 March 1948 could not erase us. Then came another in October 1958 , which led to the resistance of Nawab Nauroz Khan. He was promised amnesty on the oath of the Quran, yet on a single day—15 July 1960—six of his companions and one of his sons were hanged. Some believed it was the end of the resistance. But did it end? No. Babu Sher Mohammad Marri and Ali Mohammad Mengal stood their ground and kept the resistance alive. Peace was made in 1970, but provocations remained. So emerged the 1973–1977 insurgency to resist repression. In September 1974 , when some Marris in Chamaling surrendered under assault by gunships, the state claimed that the core of the resistance had been broken. But had it? No—because the fighting continued until 1977. That was not the end. The Marris who took refuge in Afghanistan did not return when the Zia regime offered them amnesty . Despite the hardships of life as refugees, they stayed. Khair Bakhsh Marri joined them in 1982. He remained there for nearly a decade. That act of defiance kept the spirit of the resistance alive back home. A period of apparent dormancy followed, from 1993 to 2000. But beneath the surface, resentment simmered and political awareness grew. Matters came to a head when Khair Bakhsh Marri was arrested on fabricated charges in 2000 and kept in jail for two years. That moment reignited the resistance. Then came a turning point: the killing of Akbar Bugti on 26 August 2006. Like the 1973–1977 insurgency, the fight spread across Balochistan—it has not ended. Since 2000, the Baloch have faced the severest repression. Every brutal tool at the state's disposal has been used. Our academics, such as Saba Dashtyari and Zahid Askani , have been killed; our political activists have been murdered or disappeared; our journalists have been silenced; our poets have been targeted; and our students have been abducted. And now, even our women have been incarcerated. Yet, the resistance lives on—it refuses to die. It survives because it is an expression of the people's most cherished dream. The Baloch are a resilient nation and do not give up what they hold dear—and what they hold dearest are dignity and freedom. It is no coincidence that the Baloch call their motherland Gul Zameen—Land of Flowers. As they say, Waye watan hushkain dar —I love my land even if it is like a withered twig. There is something vital that must be said. Something that has long been the bane of the Baloch Nation. Those soul-selling Baloch who have collaborated with the establishment, aiding in the suppression of Baloch rights and enabling crimes against their own people. There is an indigenous Native American fable: the birds complained of being killed by arrows, and the response was, “Were it not for the feathers of birds in the arrows, you would be safe.” Our suffering, too, would have been less had some Baloch not provided the feathers for those arrows. Let me tell you something: if brutal crackdowns and military operations could suppress a people's desire for national, political, social, and economic rights, then Algeria would still be a French colony. The French were ruthless and unforgiving. They picked people up, held them in custody, and tortured them for as long as they pleased. Yet in the end, they had to pack up and leave. The resistance, and the will of the people, could not be broken. It is said the French “won” the Battle of Algiers in 1957 by crushing the FLN in the city, but they lost the war in 1960 when the Algerian people rose up together, showing the futility of repression. Repression eventually breeds fearlessness. It compels people to abandon concern for their own safety. And here, they haven’t even won the Battle of Quetta—yet they have already lost Balochistan by irreversibly alienating the Baloch Nation. We can—and must—learn from the Palestinians, who, like us, have endured physical, economic, cultural, and geographic assaults—a systematic genocide since 1948. Yet they have never surrendered. Especially in Gaza, where since October 2023 , genocide has reached a brutal peak. Gaza has been flattened. Hospitals bombed, medical staff killed, famine imposed through a blockade of food and water. Over 60,000 people—seventy percent of them women and children—have been killed . And yet, the people of Gaza have not broken. Gaza may be a narrow strip of land, but despite the backing of powerful Western nations, Israel has failed to crush the spirit of the Gazans. Balochistan is vast. If Gaza has not been broken, then neither can we. In the end, my very precious child, I will say this: Tum maroge, hum niklenge —you will kill us, we will rise. This is not an empty phrase. It is how the Baloch have faced oppression for generations. If it were hollow, the resistance would not have persisted and grown stronger over the past seventy-seven years. It is true that a terrible price has been paid—in blood, in tears, in lost generations. But it is also the reason we have survived. We endure as a dignified nation, seeking a life of freedom and honor, and our will to resist not only endures—it flourishes. Today, I see you all protesting against state oppression, as bravely and wisely as Karima did, and I know this is why hopelessness is not an option for us. Hope is the fruit of the seeds Banuk Karima and other Baloch revolutionaries sowed in the soil of Balochistan. And so, with the accumulation of grief in adulthood, we also inherit seventy-seven years of the history of Baloch resistance, which, in spite of its traumatic chapters, is an inheritance of revolutionary hope for a free Balochistan. Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur Hyderabad 5 April 2025 ∎ More Fiction & Poetry: Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. THE VERTICAL The Stamp Uzair Rizvi When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha UZAIR RIZVI is a journalist, formerly with the Agence France Presse (AFP), who covers misinformation, elections, and technology. He is based in Delhi Dispatch Kerala 9th Apr 2026 SONALI SONAM (b. 1995, Bihar) is a visual artist whose practice draws from the discipline and visual language of miniature painting while engaging with contemporary experiences of space, memory, and perception. She studied Painting at Kala Bhavana, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, and later completed her Master’s degree at the College of Art, New Delhi. On That Note: The WhiteBoard Board 20th OCT Sinking the Body Politic 24th AUG Update from Dhaka II 21st JUL

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. | Opinion · THE VERTICAL Dispatch · Kerala The Stamp When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ SUB-HEAD Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. 9th Apr 2026 AUTHOR · AUTHOR Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. 1 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. Jeevan Ravindran Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. SUB-HEAD ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: Clare Patrick (Our) Worlds and (Plant) Wisdoms Kareen Adam · Nazish Chunara A Dhivehi Artists Showcase Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. SHARE Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism JEEVAN RAVINDRAN is a multimedia journalist based in Jaffna and London, with bylines in VICE , Reuters , CNN, and more. She reports on human rights and politics. 16 Jul 2025 Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 SUJEEWA KUMARI WEERASINGHE holds an MFA in Interdisciplinary Research Visual Arts and Media from Dutch Art Institute (2004) and a BFA in Painting from Institute of Aesthetic studies, University of Kelaniya Sri Lanka (1998). In 2019, Kumari was selected to be one of the top 30 finalist in the Sovereign Asian Art Prize. Weerasinghe's recent works come to terms with de-realised memories derived by history, tradition and daily life to formulate an artistic synthesis of new cultural images. Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. | · THE VERTICAL Reportage · Colombo The Citizen's Vote Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. SUB-HEAD Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. 16th Jul 2025 AUTHOR · AUTHOR Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. 1 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote Jeevan Ravindran Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism JEEVAN RAVINDRAN is a multimedia journalist based in Jaffna and London, with bylines in VICE , Reuters , CNN, and more. She reports on human rights and politics. Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 SUJEEWA KUMARI WEERASINGHE holds an MFA in Interdisciplinary Research Visual Arts and Media from Dutch Art Institute (2004) and a BFA in Painting from Institute of Aesthetic studies, University of Kelaniya Sri Lanka (1998). In 2019, Kumari was selected to be one of the top 30 finalist in the Sovereign Asian Art Prize. Weerasinghe's recent works come to terms with de-realised memories derived by history, tradition and daily life to formulate an artistic synthesis of new cultural images. On That Note: Storytelling in Post-Aragalaya Sri Lanka 27th AUG Whiplash and Contradiction in Sri Lanka’s aragalaya 27th FEB A State of Perpetual War: Fiction & the Sri Lankan Civil War 10th JAN

Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. | Profile · BOOKS & ARTS Profile · Lahore Speaking Through the Subaltern Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. Amrita Sher-Gil, Group of Three Girls , 1935, oil on canvas, 99.5 x 73.5 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ SUB-HEAD Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Profile Lahore Punjab Amrita Sher-Gil Orientalism Western Gaze Europe South Asia Subaltern Studies Gayatri Spivak Anti-Colonialism Postcolonial Feminist Theory subjectivity saviorism indianization Gauguin Foucault 1935 Group of Three Girls Self-Portrait as a Tahitian Young Girls Feminism Feminist Art Practice femininity feminine Modernism Bauhaus Avant-Garde Traditions Paul Gauguin Deleuze Primitivism Modernity Postcolonialism Avant-Garde Form Semiotic Color Post-Impressionism Art History Art Criticism Criticism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. 8th Jul 2025 AUTHOR · AUTHOR Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. 1 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. DISPATCH Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Next Up:

Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. BOOKS & ARTS Speaking Through the Subaltern Vamika Sinha Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Amrita Sher-Gil, Group of Three Girls , 1935, oil on canvas, 99.5 x 73.5 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Profile Lahore Punjab Amrita Sher-Gil Orientalism Western Gaze Europe South Asia Subaltern Studies Gayatri Spivak Anti-Colonialism Postcolonial Feminist Theory subjectivity saviorism indianization Gauguin Foucault 1935 Group of Three Girls Self-Portrait as a Tahitian Young Girls Feminism Feminist Art Practice femininity feminine Modernism Bauhaus Avant-Garde Traditions Paul Gauguin Deleuze Primitivism Modernity Postcolonialism Avant-Garde Form Semiotic Color Post-Impressionism Art History Art Criticism Criticism VAMIKA SINHA is an arts and culture journalist based in London. She is Deputy Editor at Wasafiri. Profile Lahore 8th Jul 2025 On That Note: The Ahmadis of Petrópolis 21st JAN Chats Ep. 5 · Tamil translation & Perumal Murugan's “Poonachi” 7th DEC The Pre-Partition Indian Avant-Garde 25th AUG

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. GENERAL REPORTAGE AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. More Fiction & Poetry: Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5

Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. BOOKS & ARTS Speaking Through the Subaltern Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. Vamika Sinha Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ SUB-HEAD ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR (Our) Worlds and (Plant) Wisdoms AUTHOR A Dhivehi Artists Showcase Amrita Sher-Gil, Group of Three Girls , 1935, oil on canvas, 99.5 x 73.5 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. SHARE Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Profile Lahore Punjab Amrita Sher-Gil Orientalism Western Gaze Europe South Asia Subaltern Studies Gayatri Spivak Anti-Colonialism Postcolonial Feminist Theory subjectivity saviorism indianization Gauguin Foucault 1935 Group of Three Girls Self-Portrait as a Tahitian Young Girls Feminism Feminist Art Practice femininity feminine Modernism Bauhaus Avant-Garde Traditions Paul Gauguin Deleuze Primitivism Modernity Postcolonialism Avant-Garde Form Semiotic Color Post-Impressionism Art History Art Criticism Criticism VAMIKA SINHA is an arts and culture journalist based in London. She is Deputy Editor at Wasafiri. 8 Jul 2025 Profile Lahore 8th Jul 2025 The Ahmadis of Petrópolis Sana Khan 21st Jan Chats Ep. 5 · Tamil translation & Perumal Murugan's “Poonachi” N Kalyan Raman 7th Dec Romantic Literature and Colonialism Mani Samriti Chander 13th Nov Origins of Modernism & the Avant-Garde in India Amit Chaudhuri 4th Oct The Pre-Partition Indian Avant-Garde Partha Mitter 25th Aug On That Note:

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. THE VERTICAL The Stamp When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. VOL. 2 DISPATCH AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Dispatch Kerala 9th Apr 2026 Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ More Fiction & Poetry: Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5