Pakistan continues to terrorize activists, young and old, for protesting the enforced disappearances of their brothers, sisters, and forefathers—losses the Baloch people are never truly allowed to mourn. In a letter addressed to Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur, a public intellectual who has devoted the past 54 years of his life to the Baloch liberation struggle, a young Baloch journalist seeks reprieve from a fate that seems increasingly inevitable, hoping to transform her grief into revolutionary fervor. | · THE VERTICAL Letter · Balochistan Letter to History (I) Pakistan continues to terrorize activists, young and old, for protesting the enforced disappearances of their brothers, sisters, and forefathers—losses the Baloch people are never truly allowed to mourn. In a letter addressed to Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur, a public intellectual who has devoted the past 54 years of his life to the Baloch liberation struggle, a young Baloch journalist seeks reprieve from a fate that seems increasingly inevitable, hoping to transform her grief into revolutionary fervor. Iman Iftikhar Mahrang (2025) Digital Illustration Editor’s Note: Sammi Deen Baloch was released by Pakistani authorities on April 1, a few days after this letter was first written. Dear Ustad Talpur, Baba Jan, you have watched generations disappear into dust. You know that time is a deceiver, that history is nothing but a long repetition of grief. Baba Jan, you have poured hope into a land that devours it. And still, you stand unshaken. I am writing to you without clarity about the purpose of my words. Perhaps, in times like these—when the sky is thick with grief, when silence is louder than gunfire, when even breathing feels like an act of defiance—writing is the only rebellion left. Or maybe it’s futile, a whisper against a storm, a candle in the abyss. How do I put into words a war, as they like to call it, which is just an unbroken cycle of operations to erase our very existence? I’ve been thinking about how adulthood is merely the accumulation of grief we carry and bury. And childhood, a baptism in violence. So, I write––tracing the outlines of our pain with ink, carving our memory into words. When bullets meet our bodies, do they make the same sound as the shackles that screeched against our land when they dragged Mahrang and Sammi? The leaders who carried the weight of history on their shoulders, who held up the sky when it threatened to collapse, who turned the grief of generations into fire. Mahrang and Sammi, who taught the Baloch they must stop being forever mourners, forever betrayed. On March 21, 13-year-old Naimat was shot . Then a disabled man, Bebarg, was dragged from his home and disappeared. Tell me, Baba Jan, how do we live through this time, where a child’s heart is not enough to satiate the state's insatiable hunger for spilling Baloch blood? What kind of state fears a crippled man’s voice? And what is more tragic than little Kambar? A child who once held a poster of his missing father, Chairman Zahid, and now, eleven years later, in the same cursed month of March, clutches another picture. This time it is his uncle Shah Jan who has been stolen by the same hands—a state that ensures no Baloch child feels fatherly love, that makes Baloch men disposable. Tell me, Baba Jan, does history ever grow weary of itself? Or will this violence continue to carve itself into our bones? Baba Jan, Balochistan stands at a precipice again. In the past two decades, they have buried entire generations, making mourning a permanent state of our existence. And today, the storm rages once more. The crackdown on the Baloch Yakjehti Committee. The arrests. The stifling of resistance. Dr. Mahrang Baloch taken under fabricated charges. The roads are flooding with protesters, repeating the same chant once more: Tum Marogy, Hum Niklengy . Our streets heard the same words when Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was martyred. When the state unleashed its bloodied military crackdown in 2009. When Karima’s voice—one of the fiercest of our time—was silenced under the most sinister of circumstances. We chanted our pain into resistance. And today, we find ourselves trapped in the same cycle, bracing for what the state has yet to unleash. This is why I write to you, Baba Jan—not just as a thinker, but as a witness to history itself. Who else but you can grasp the chaos that takes root in the minds of the Baloch when faced with such devastation? When conscious, educated youth find themselves at a crossroads, they can only turn to history for answers. But in our case, history does not reside in books—it resides with you. You who saw the flames of 2006 and 2009. You who watched as mass graves were unearthed in 2014. You who lived through the fear and silence that followed Karima’s assassination in 2020. And now, new voices have risen—heirs to those who were brutally taken from us—only to face the same violence, the same retribution. Mahrang and Sammi, whose voices once echoed through the streets, are now being held in cells. A process of erasure perfected over decades. The Baloch lose another voice. And the bloodshed continues. Mothers become wombless. Wives become widows. Fathers become ghosts. Sons search for fathers. Fathers search for sons. And now, mothers search for daughters. Tell me, Baba Jan, what is the state preparing to do next? Will it follow the same script, crushing these voices as it did with the Baloch political leadership before? What consequences will this new wave of repression bring, especially at a time when the armed struggle has only grown stronger? Is it possible that the other oppressed nations of this land will stand with us in defiance of a shared oppressor? Can we still hope that the so-called civilized world will intervene before more of our people are swallowed by this unrelenting state brutality? Or will the detention of women be normalized too? I am worried that the state is now seeking to terrify young Baloch girls who stand firm despite the leadership’s arrest. It seems as if the state is entering a new phase of oppression, sending a message to Baloch women who dare to defy: Beware. Stand down. Who will stand with us? I am writing to you for hope. I am writing to you for answers. Tell me, Baba Jan, are we destined to be forever caught in this storm, forever erased, forever replaced? Signed, A young Baloch writer and journalist∎ SUB-HEAD Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Letter Balochistan Pakistan Activism Enforced Disappearances State Violence Protests Liberation Journalism Revolution Grief Sammi Deen Baloch Resistance History Violence Writing After Loss Dissidence Disappearance Baloch Yakjehti Committee Dr Mahrang Baloch Arrests Tum Marogy Hum Niklengy Militarism Leadership Mass Graves Assassination New Voices Imprisonment Armed Struggle Repression Oppression Defiance Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. 3rd Apr 2025 AUTHOR · AUTHOR Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. 1 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. DISPATCH Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Next Up:

Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. BOOKS & ARTS Speaking Through the Subaltern Vamika Sinha Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Amrita Sher-Gil, Group of Three Girls , 1935, oil on canvas, 99.5 x 73.5 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Profile Lahore Punjab Amrita Sher-Gil Orientalism Western Gaze Europe South Asia Subaltern Studies Gayatri Spivak Anti-Colonialism Postcolonial Feminist Theory subjectivity saviorism indianization Gauguin Foucault 1935 Group of Three Girls Self-Portrait as a Tahitian Young Girls Feminism Feminist Art Practice femininity feminine Modernism Bauhaus Avant-Garde Traditions Paul Gauguin Deleuze Primitivism Modernity Postcolonialism Avant-Garde Form Semiotic Color Post-Impressionism Art History Art Criticism Criticism VAMIKA SINHA is an arts and culture journalist based in London. She is Deputy Editor at Wasafiri. Profile Lahore 8th Jul 2025 On That Note: The Ahmadis of Petrópolis 21st JAN Chats Ep. 5 · Tamil translation & Perumal Murugan's “Poonachi” 7th DEC The Pre-Partition Indian Avant-Garde 25th AUG

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. GENERAL REPORTAGE AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. More Fiction & Poetry: Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5

Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. BOOKS & ARTS Speaking Through the Subaltern Seeking a home beyond Europe and South Asia could provide, Amrita Sher-Gil wrestled with a duality of being that reflected in her oeuvre. A Spivakian reading of her 1935 work Group of Three Girls sees Sher-Gil as an accomplice in perpetuating the Orientalist gaze she faced while trying to prove her prowess to Western audiences unable to view her art as equal. Vamika Sinha Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ Group of Three Girls is widely considered one of Amrita Sher-Gil’s masterpieces. The 1935 artwork has become increasingly popular over the years as a symbol of Indian feminism, while Sher-Gil herself has gained more international recognition and seen an increase in art market capitalization. In the South Asian subcontinent, she has become canonical and even adopted into the Indian state’s official historical national narrative. A major road in central Delhi is named Amrita Shergill Marg, while her works are labeled national “art treasures” that “cannot be taken out of the country.” Sher-Gil’s elevated status, especially through Group of Three Girls , was influenced by the academic boom of postcolonial and intersectional feminist methodologies around the 1990s, which have trickled into the mainstream. A central scholar driving that boom has certainly been Indian theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose seminal 1988 essay , “Can the Subaltern Speak?” critiques how Western intellectual discourse perpetuates and constructs the “Other,” or the “subaltern” subject. Spivak insists, however, on the subaltern’s heterogeneity—that it is not a monolith, but endlessly diverse, stratified, and therefore unstable. This idea was clearly a precursor to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s introduction to “intersectionality” in 1989. The term “subaltern” gets bandied about regularly. Spivak’s theory has been elevated to near-pop status in online and academic discourses, but is the subaltern still a useful term? Is Spivak still relevant when her own status as a global public intellectual has suffered the arrows of critiques like caste-blindness and complicity with capitalist pandering? Remember that strange Aesop ad? However, a debate on Spivak as a figurehead is not on today’s table. If the term “subaltern” has been propelled into ubiquity to the point of irony and satirical smirking, we can continue to test its value on different canvases. Today, that is Amrita Sher-Gil’s, specifically her painting, Group of Three Girls . In this work, Sher-Gil transmits a vulnerable period of India’s past, through her privileged Indo-European body, onto the rural Indian women depicted on her canvas. By ventriloquizing lower-class female Indian bodies to express and cope with her own feelings of cultural alienation and dislocation, she becomes a subaltern speaking through another subaltern. Is this problematic or a genuine act of solidarity—an attempt to connect with the pain of others? This Spivakian reading of Sher-Gil’s work attempts to expose a more nuanced interpretation of the painting as a complex ethical problem. More widely, it situates Group of Three Girls as a cultural object both embedded within and symbolic of the fragile, unstable historiography of the Indian nation—once a subaltern state tussling between colonialism and nationalism, on the cusp of partition and independence. Sher-Gil as Subaltern? Born in Budapest to a Hungarian opera singer and a Sikh aristocrat-scholar who was “one of the first photographers of South Asia,” Sher-Gil did most of her artistic training in Italy and France. According to Linda Nochlin’s iconic 1971 essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?”, Sher-Gil possessed all the crucial factors needed to achieve success as a female artist: formal European art training, a well-networked artistic family and peer circle, money, mobility and independence, and the mentorship of older, more powerful male artists. But she was also plagued by a crisis of belonging. In Group of Three Girls, three Indian women, dressed modestly in Punjabi salwar kameez outfits, sit in front of a jute-brown background. Their hair is mostly hidden by their dupattas. Their clothes are largely plain, though the material looks gauzy, even diaphanous, thanks to Sher-Gil’s long, languid brushstrokes. Influenced by post-Impressionism , she paints the women in solid, vivid colors. One wears vibrant pistachio green, the other a pulsating saffron, while the final dons a deep vermilion. None of the subjects meet the viewer’s eyes. Their gazes are faraway and downcast, evoking resigned melancholy, or perhaps the strangely beatific expression of the serenity in accepting defeat. The women do not touch or look at each other, as if each was pasted separately in a collage. While the colors and brushstrokes teem with warmth and dynamism, the figures themselves appear frozen, alienated, and emotionally distanced: “together…yet alone,” in the words of art historian Giles Tillotson . A light from outside the image casts shadows on the wall behind them. One’s immediate urge may be to code the subjects as lower-class, oppressed Indian women upon seeing their simple, traditional clothing and mute, passive, and despondent stances. This reading is reinforced by two aspects from Sher-Gil’s previous paintings: first, Sher-Gil’s earlier use of shadows, such as in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian (1934), signified a looming, intrusive male presence, according to art historian Saloni Mathur. In Group of Three Girls, the shadows could symbolize the rigidities of patriarchy, particularly of impending marriage. The painting can further be contrasted with one of Sher-Gil’s earlier European works, Young Girls (1932), in which two women occupy a figuratively warmer space, their bodies angled towards each other, displaying an intimacy and closeness missing from Group of Three Girls. The two “young girls” appear as connected yet distinct people, given how elaborately they are painted, lending their dress, clothes, hair, and surroundings multiple depths of light and texture. In contrast, the women in Group of Three Girls , whose formal depiction is comparatively flatter, become more symbols than individuals. Instead of appearing as a particular group of women bound by a close relationship, the “three girls” become every group of women, isolated but bound only by the circumstances of being Indian, female, and subaltern. Amrita Sher-Gil, Young Girls , 1932, oil on canvas, 164 cm × 133 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. But the subaltern itself is an “essentialist” or unfixed concept. Spivak highlights the slippages within the hierarchical, “taxonomic” categorizing of subaltern identities to demonstrate their relational nature—that they are always formed in relation to another individual or group's identity, ultimately rendering them unreliable. In other words, someone may be a subaltern in one context but an oppressor in another. For Sher-Gil, her half-whiteness, wealth, and European elite upbringing lent her enormous privilege in British India, making the rural subjects she painted subaltern in relation to her primarily via social class. Yet in the eyes of the West, up to decades after she died in 1941, Sher-Gil was herself subaltern via race, gender, and geography; she was a less relevant, less authentic woman of color who predominantly painted in and about a Third World colony. A Crisis of Belonging Group of Three Girls is the first painting Sher-Gil produced after leaving Europe in 1934 for a growingly anti-colonial India. Upon her arrival, she proclaimed her “artistic mission” was to “interpret the life of Indians, particularly the poor…silent images of infinite submission and patience…angular brown bodies, strangely beautiful in their ugliness.” Her painting was the first manifestation of this articulated desire to speak on behalf of the subaltern. Sher-Gil would go on to build on this painting’s style and subjects for the rest of her life, depicting Indian women and rural village scenes in flatter forms and hotter colors. Still, her “mission” reads as cliché and problematic today. Seeded firmly and formally in Group of Three Girls , it can be faulted in the same way as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s writings were by Spivak in 1988, who criticized them for making marginalized peoples into a monolith, essentializing, aestheticizing, and further Othering “them”. Meanwhile, the two scholars maintained the elevation and centrality of their Western gazes while assigning virtue to the subaltern solely through their tragedy and oppression. This critique exposes how Sher-Gil denies Group of Three Girls ’ subjects a sense of individuality or agency. The green-clad woman’s hand is cut off from the frame. The red-clad woman’s left palm faces upwards, as if begging or in surrender. Through Sher-Gil’s downward, Westernized outsider gaze, the subjects are only brought together in a homogenizing representation of subaltern Indian women as downtrodden, helpless, and paralyzed. This reading is supported by Sher-Gil’s significant preoccupation with Paul Gauguin’s Tahiti paintings at the time, which she was riffing on in Self-Portrait as a Tahitian . Gauguin’s work itself has been heavily critiqued for his flat, Orientalist depictions of Tahitian women through a colonial, patriarchal gaze. The structure and output of such a dominant gaze play out similarly in Group of Three Girls, where Sher-Gil represents her subjects “in the singular, as archetypes of humanity,” as Mathur writes, “reproduc[ing]…Gauguin’s primitivist gesture.” Amrita Sher-Gil, Self-Portrait as a Tahitian , 1934, oil on canvas, 90 cm × 56 cm, Kiran Nadar Museum of Art, New Delhi. But Sher-Gil was not a complete outsider like Gauguin, as a half-Indian who had already spent much time in India before moving there at the end of 1934. It was both an exciting and painful homecoming. As Mathur notes , Sher-Gil “sought a point of entry into the cultural landscape…from the difficult position of standing partially outside it.” Sher-Gil felt India would offer her more belonging than a racist Europe—a Paris reviewer once diminished her as “an exquisite and mysterious little Hindu princess” who… “conjure[d] up the mysterious shores of the Ganges.” Yet she was simultaneously apprehensive about not fitting into the Indian cultural landscape. Indeed, as Mathur points out, “Sher-Gil’s early detractors in the subcontinent complained that her Indian portraiture ‘smel[t] of the west.’” For Mathur, it was precisely Sher-Gil’s “sense of fragmentation and cultural isolation” that drove her practice. The artist once reflected: ‘It may be that the sadness, the queer ugliness of the types I choose as my models…corresponds to...some inner trait in my nature…’” These models sometimes included Sher-Gil’s own servants. Grappling With Sher-Gil’s Legacy Art historians such as Geeta Kapur have criticized Sher-Gil’s “narcissistic” attempt to transmute her cultural crisis into catharsis by entwining and equating her pain with that of poorer Indians amid political and national turbulence. In Spivakian terms, Sher-Gil employed her dominant gaze to speak through the subaltern for her own benefit. But others have been more benevolent, foregrounding not the inequality between Sher-Gil and her subjects, but the points of solidarity instead. Writers like Mulk Raj Anand have emphasized how truly moved Sher-Gil was by the poverty and patriarchy blighting India at the time. Scholars such as Prachi Priyanka and Subir Rana have highlighted the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on her paintings. “Gandhi’s notion of Swaraj (self-rule), and Nehru’s concept of ‘Indianization’ ” seeped into works which, beginning with Group of Three Girls , Rana writes, were even considered for use by “Congress propaganda for village reconstruction.” The use of the saffron color in Group of Three Girls, which was eventually incorporated into the Indian national flag, is further evidence of Sher-Gil’s alignment with the Independence movement. She also used the red introduced in this painting more liberally and intentionally in later works, such as Woman on Charpai (1940), to represent women’s desires while conveying their repression. This use of what Rana calls “ semiotic color ” perhaps reflected a growing awareness and redressal of the flatter female representation she had begun in Group of Three Girls , possibly due to more intimacy with and time spent in India. Still, Sher-Gil’s work suffered from similar pitfalls as Gandhian philosophies: a sense of saviorism, romanticization, and Orientalization of a more authentic pre-colonial India, and a homogenizing class and caste-blindness. Spivak challenged “the ‘lie’ of global sisterhood between ‘First world’ and ‘Third world’ women… [while] highlight[ing] the failure of Indian nationalism to emancipate lower-class, subaltern women.” A Spivakian reading of Group of Three Girls neatly encapsulates this argument: Sher-Gil transplants her ‘First world’ gaze onto the Indian women subaltern to her while using the grammar of Indian anti-colonial nationalist ideologies. But it does nothing to speak for or help her subjects, beyond stimulating her own aspiration to transcend her displacement. In 2015, it was revealed that the women in the Group of Three Girls were actually Sher-Gil’s upper-class nieces, not subalterns, after all. But this knowledge did little to impact the painting’s narrativization. There was no rewriting, no uproar. Ultimately, the way the girls are painted remains the same. Yet the way we look at them—and the artist’s gaze upon them—can evolve. Retrospectively, Group of Three Girls is the catalyst for examining how Sher-Gil’s practice went on to “embod[y] the most painful paradoxes of a colonial modernity.” A common, knee-jerk contemporary reading of Group of Three Girls may find it admirable due to Sher-Gil’s mixed identity, or its romantic representation of “the Indian woman” as feminist and patriotic, or because the Indian state has adopted it as the pièce de resistance of the “mother of modern Indian art.” However, an engaged Spivakian reading reveals it to be a historical object emblematic of the tensions of pre-Independent India, revealing a methodology for analyzing the present. The beauty of this work lies not just in its artistry or the sense of relation it might evoke among Indian female viewers, but that it distills so much of the ethical, identity-based dilemmas interlocked at the heart of the Indian nation historically and today.∎ SUB-HEAD ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR (Our) Worlds and (Plant) Wisdoms AUTHOR A Dhivehi Artists Showcase Amrita Sher-Gil, Group of Three Girls , 1935, oil on canvas, 99.5 x 73.5 cm, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. SHARE Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Profile Lahore Punjab Amrita Sher-Gil Orientalism Western Gaze Europe South Asia Subaltern Studies Gayatri Spivak Anti-Colonialism Postcolonial Feminist Theory subjectivity saviorism indianization Gauguin Foucault 1935 Group of Three Girls Self-Portrait as a Tahitian Young Girls Feminism Feminist Art Practice femininity feminine Modernism Bauhaus Avant-Garde Traditions Paul Gauguin Deleuze Primitivism Modernity Postcolonialism Avant-Garde Form Semiotic Color Post-Impressionism Art History Art Criticism Criticism VAMIKA SINHA is an arts and culture journalist based in London. She is Deputy Editor at Wasafiri. 8 Jul 2025 Profile Lahore 8th Jul 2025 The Ahmadis of Petrópolis Sana Khan 21st Jan Chats Ep. 5 · Tamil translation & Perumal Murugan's “Poonachi” N Kalyan Raman 7th Dec Romantic Literature and Colonialism Mani Samriti Chander 13th Nov Origins of Modernism & the Avant-Garde in India Amit Chaudhuri 4th Oct The Pre-Partition Indian Avant-Garde Partha Mitter 25th Aug On That Note:

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. THE VERTICAL The Stamp When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. VOL. 2 DISPATCH AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Dispatch Kerala 9th Apr 2026 Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ More Fiction & Poetry: Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5 Date Authors Heading 5

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. THE VERTICAL The Stamp AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. DISPATCH Dispatch Kerala 9th Apr 2026 On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Next Up:

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. THE VERTICAL The Stamp When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. Uzair Rizvi On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ SUB-HEAD ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: Clare Patrick (Our) Worlds and (Plant) Wisdoms Kareen Adam · Nazish Chunara A Dhivehi Artists Showcase Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. SHARE Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha UZAIR RIZVI is a journalist, formerly with the Agence France Presse (AFP), who covers misinformation, elections, and technology. He is based in Delhi 9 Apr 2026 Dispatch Kerala 9th Apr 2026 SONALI SONAM (b. 1995, Bihar) is a visual artist whose practice draws from the discipline and visual language of miniature painting while engaging with contemporary experiences of space, memory, and perception. She studied Painting at Kala Bhavana, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, and later completed her Master’s degree at the College of Art, New Delhi. The Changing Landscape of Heritage Saranya Subramanian 13th Feb Coalition of the Willing Aisha Ahmad 15th Nov The WhiteBoard Board Mahmud Rahman 20th Oct Sinking the Body Politic Dipanjan Sinha 24th Aug Update from Dhaka II Shahidul Alam 21st Jul On That Note:

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. THE VERTICAL The Stamp Uzair Rizvi When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: AUTHOR Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 Heading 5 AUTHOR Heading 5 Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. SHARE Facebook ↗ Twitter ↗ LinkedIn ↗ Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha UZAIR RIZVI is a journalist, formerly with the Agence France Presse (AFP), who covers misinformation, elections, and technology. He is based in Delhi Dispatch Kerala 9th Apr 2026 SONALI SONAM (b. 1995, Bihar) is a visual artist whose practice draws from the discipline and visual language of miniature painting while engaging with contemporary experiences of space, memory, and perception. She studied Painting at Kala Bhavana, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, and later completed her Master’s degree at the College of Art, New Delhi. On That Note: The WhiteBoard Board 20th OCT Sinking the Body Politic 24th AUG Update from Dhaka II 21st JUL

When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. | Opinion · THE VERTICAL Dispatch · Kerala The Stamp When a Bharatiya Janata Party stamp mistakenly appeared on an official letter from the Election Commission of India, it revealed more about the state of Indian democracy than any clerical error conceivably should. As voters head to the polls today in Kerala's State Assembly election, their votes are beholden to an institution that has long since stopped trying to earn their trust. Sonali Sonam, Journey 2 (2020). Watercolour on paper. On March 23, the Kerala state wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) posted a picture on its official X account that created a furore in Indian politics. It showed an official communication from India’s Election Commission—a constitutional body established to ensure free, impartial, and fair elections in the country—prominently displaying the BJP's Kerala Unit seal. Seen on an Election Commission of India (ECI) document that was sent out to various political parties and district collectors across Kerala, eighteen days ahead of the elections in India’s southernmost state. The caption under the image in the post needed no explanation. “Have all pretences been dropped by the BJP?” it read. “It is no secret that the same power centre appears to control both the Election Commission of India and the BJP. Even so, at least have the decency of maintaining two separate desks.” The Election Commission had the following response: “The BJP Kerala Unit had recently approached the CEO’s office seeking clarification on the 2019 guidelines regarding the publication of criminal antecedents of candidates. Along with their request, the party submitted a photocopy of the original 2019 directive. The party’s seal was present on that specific copy provided by them. Due to an oversight, the office failed to notice the party symbol on the submitted document and inadvertently redistributed it to other political parties as part of the requested clarification. The guidelines in question have undergone revisions since 2019, which have already been communicated to all political entities. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged the lapse as soon as it was detected.” Chief Electoral Officer Ratan U. Kelkar called it an “inexcusable error” and said that once the mistake was spotted, a withdrawal notice was issued the same day. An Assistant Section Officer handling the file was suspended pending inquiry, and a detailed probe was launched, expected to conclude within 48 hours. Recorded as simply a clerical error, immediately rectified, an officer was suspended. The case was dismissed. The document in question is not obscure. It is a standard FAQ about candidates' criminal records, something that election officials have issued dozens of times. In fact, the BJP's 2019 version of this FAQ has been in government files for seven years. It bears its stamp. The claim is that someone took this document, overlooked the stamp, and sent it out. It's possible. Then again, why would the BJP's seven-year-old stamped copy be accessible to this official? After all, these FAQs have been amended since 2019. The suggestion is that the officials both chose to share the incorrect document, and that the unrevised versions originated from a political party's submission. Thus, here we are: with an explanation that is technically plausible, but in the current political climate, one that is impossible to accept at face value. India’s opposition political party, the Indian National Congress, leader Pawan Khera did not let this irony slip by, asking whether the BJP's victories in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, 2019, and 2024 were also the result of similar “clerical errors.” Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal state Chief Minister and fierce critic of the BJP, went a step further. “Was it a clerical mistake in the design of the BJP symbol, or was it an attempt to fulfill political objectives?” she said , calling for all political parties to fight the one-sided, one-party rule over all institutional processes. The Criminal Stamp One could, with considerable straining of the imagination, try to understand the initial incident in terms of administrative carelessness. However, the subsequent crackdown subverts all such theories. The Kerala Police issued notices to 270 X handles, 200 Facebook pages, and 90 Instagram accounts, demanding that the shared image of the offending circular be removed. Facebook and Instagram, in response to police directives, took down posts containing the image. Let us be clear about what is being suppressed. It is not an edited picture. Nor is it a false or AI-generated document that could be construed as spreading disinformation. It is an image of a real letter from the Election Commission's own offices, bearing a BJP seal. Critically, the authorities had already acknowledged it as being real before explaining it away as an error. Citizen users who were sharing real, acknowledged, and official information were now being issued legal notices and had their information removed. This development has sparked many opinions in the state. Many feel that the police infrastructure is being utilised to stifle discourse rather than tackling crime. It is the irony in this instance of suppression, perhaps, that gives it the sharpest edge. Kerala Police sits under the jurisdiction of the Election Commission while the Model Code of Conduct is in place. The body, whose official document carried the ruling party's seal, is now seeking to suppress information sharing and erase evidence-based citizen reporting. The Proxy Stamp The ECI has struggled with a crisis of credibility for a decade. With this struggle, questions from opposition parties and observers of India's elections continue to increase amidst a build-up of events and silences. The opposition political party leader, Rahul Gandhi, has spent the better part of a year giving presentations on what he calls “documented evidence” of “vote chori” or the vote theft: that around 2.5 million votes were stolen in northern state of Haryana, citing that more than a hundred thousand voters had fake photographs, including that of a Brazilian model who appeared on 22 different voter registrations. During a 2024 election in the north Indian city of Chandigarh, a presiding officer was caught on CCTV in the middle of the count, appearing to deface the ballot papers. To this, the Supreme Court remarked : "This is a mockery of democracy.” Earlier this year, in the western state of Maharashtra, electronic voting machines were found in the car of an election official. The appointment mechanism for the Election Commissioners has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The speed and bias in the enforcement of the code of conduct are questioned after every election. The trust required to make the election process in a democracy credible has been breached for years. The BJP stamp did not create this crisis. But it has become a symbol for it. It is a symbol that leaves no room for ambiguity because it cannot be rationalised away, appearing as it did in a state that was three weeks away from elections. The ECI was set up to safeguard the constitution; it is the only body powerful enough to make elections meaningful. But in the minds of its citizens and democratic observers, it is now a body that confuses process with accountability. It suspends officers, issues clarifications, and holds press conferences. Most troublingly, the EC does not act in a way that could be logically perceived as an attempt to earn back the public's trust. An institution that has faith in its own integrity would not suppress accurate information. It would not serve notices to 560 social media accounts for publishing a document it has already admitted to be true. It would not invoke the powers of the Model Code of Conduct to police inconvenient evidence from the public domain. It would not view the citizens it exists to serve as a problem to be managed. The Election Commission and the entire democratic process in 2026 are so closely intertwined that observers no longer seem to be able to distinguish between them. It is not about the presence of the stamp, the suspended officer, or the midnight movements of voting machines; these institutions would prefer it to be known. It is a fateful crisis in the EC itself. Kerala votes today. Counting is on May 4. ∎ SUB-HEAD Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Dispatch Kerala BJP Elections Electioneering CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) Election Commission Stamp Bureaucracy Democracy The Guise of Democracy Corruption Social Media Crackdown Crisis Public Trust Model Code of Conduct Kerala Police Police Party Politics Rahul Gandhi Ratan U. Kelkar Mamata Banerjee West Bengal Pawan Khera Congress State Power State Capture Clientelism Rajya Sabha Parliament State Legislative Assemblies Vidhan Sabha Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. 9th Apr 2026 AUTHOR · AUTHOR Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. 1 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. THE VERTICAL The Citizen's Vote Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. Jeevan Ravindran Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. SUB-HEAD ALSO IN THIS ISSUE: Clare Patrick (Our) Worlds and (Plant) Wisdoms Kareen Adam · Nazish Chunara A Dhivehi Artists Showcase Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. SHARE Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism JEEVAN RAVINDRAN is a multimedia journalist based in Jaffna and London, with bylines in VICE , Reuters , CNN, and more. She reports on human rights and politics. 16 Jul 2025 Reportage Colombo 16th Jul 2025 SUJEEWA KUMARI WEERASINGHE holds an MFA in Interdisciplinary Research Visual Arts and Media from Dutch Art Institute (2004) and a BFA in Painting from Institute of Aesthetic studies, University of Kelaniya Sri Lanka (1998). In 2019, Kumari was selected to be one of the top 30 finalist in the Sovereign Asian Art Prize. Weerasinghe's recent works come to terms with de-realised memories derived by history, tradition and daily life to formulate an artistic synthesis of new cultural images. Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note:

Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. | · THE VERTICAL Reportage · Colombo The Citizen's Vote Alarms of change sounded in 2024 for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history—the leader of the controversial far-Left JVP was elected President, and the majority coalition in parliament is now led by the Marxist party. But not everyone was sold from the outset, perhaps for reasons manifest now in the current president’s follow-through on promises to the poor and respect for the historically marginalized. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (2022), oil on canvas. Sri Lanka finally has a new face at the helm—a man who brands himself as a political outsider, people’s man, and harbinger of change. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who assumed the presidency in September 2024, is navigating Sri Lanka’s road out of a crippling economic crisis that caused the masses to lose faith in the island’s political dynasties. But Dissanayake’s victory is arguably more about citizens’ disillusionment with the status quo than it is about a real belief in his politics, which are controversial particularly for his party’s history of violent insurgency during the 1970s and 1980s ; it is otherwise difficult to explain a surge in popularity from 3 percent in the 2019 election to 42 percent in the 2024 election . 2024 also marked the first instance of a president failing to claim an outright majority on first-preference votes alone, and the number of spoiled or invalid votes was the highest in history at 300,000 , more than double compared to 2019. Ultimately, all signs of an island, divided in its voting intentions. “We didn’t get anything we hoped for,” said 37-year-old government bank employee Iresha, speaking to SAAG ahead of the election about the political situation of the country over the last five years. “Politicians made empty promises. They didn’t do what they promised they would. They did what they wanted to do. Because of that, right now we are thinking that the JVP is the solution.” Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Tinted narratives 1 (2018), Mixed media on canvas. The JVP, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, is the political party Dissanayake is the leader of—as well as a member of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance that claimed victory in September’s presidential elections, as well as a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections that followed two months later. The faith people have in the JVP is significant not just because they have never been in power before, but because they were responsible for two violent Marxist insurrections against the Sri Lankan government in the 1970s and 1980s that led to tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances . “They murdered people, they closed down the shops, they destroyed government property,” said rickshaw driver Chaminda Pushpakumara, explaining why he was unable to support the JVP in the election. “In 1987, it was really tough.” Pushpakumara opted instead to support incumbent Ranil Wickremesinghe, who took the reins of the country in 2022 following a desperate economic crisis caused by an ill-fated fertiliser ban, a decline in tourism amid the COVID-19 pandemic , and financial mismanagement by then-president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Widespread protests triggered his resignation, and he fled the country. Wickremesinghe was elected in a secret ballot less than two weeks later. He was unpopular with protesters, who saw him as a crony of the Rajapaksas, as he had served as acting Prime Minister just before Rajapaksa’s resignation. Three years after the economic crisis began, some families are still struggling to stay afloat. Auto-rickshaw driver Ajantha Gunadasa said his family sometimes has their electricity cut when they’re unable to pay the bills. “If we eat today, then we have to go to work tomorrow,” he said. “If we pay our light bill and electricity bills, then we don’t have any money for food.” It was this frustration that led him to vote for Dissanayake. Unlike Pushpakumara, he was not put off by the JVP’s past. “Who hasn’t done something bad in this country?” he said, reflecting on the decades of violence inflicted on the Tamil minority by the Sinhalese government—an issue that primary candidates engaged with far less in the most recent election than in previous ones, perhaps because the cost of living was the primary factor in most voters’ minds. “The people who came to power on a racist platform have destroyed the country,” said Gunadasa. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Presence of the past iii (2019), oil on canvas. Former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa is one such example—when he was the defence minister, he oversaw the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northeast in 2009, during the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War. Although Gunadasa voted for Rajapaksa in 2019, like many others, the economic crisis changed his view of the Rajapaksa clan. “When your parents were your age, they would have lived in so much fear in Jaffna,” Gunadasa tells me, after finding out my family is from the island’s north. It’s true. I grew up hearing stories of how my mother had to flee home, fearing for her safety during the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s (IPKF) occupation in 1987 , when her house was shelled by the Sri Lankan Army. Despite his victory, Dissanayake’s electoral campaign did not connect with all voters, especially those from marginalised communities: Electoral maps show that he failed to appeal to Tamil voters in Sri Lanka’s northern, eastern and central provinces especially. This may be in part because of his positions prior to the election on several key issues. He said he would not seek to punish anyone accused of war crimes or human rights violations—including those committed against Tamils. He also campaigned against a ceasefire during Sri Lanka’s civil war in the 2000s, which was harmful to Tamil communities in the country, whose lives were torn apart by the conflict. Since they came into power, his alliance, the NPP, have dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment, which promises devolved powers to the north, as “ not necessary ”. And Dissanayake’s pre-recorded presidential address to the nation did not include subtitles or a translation in Tamil, making it impossible for many to understand, and prompting criticism from Tamils on social media. Tamils instead voted overwhelmingly for Sajith Premadasa in the last election , a two-time presidential hopeful and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The elder Premadasa served as President from 1989 to 1993 before he was assassinated by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ), the militant group who fought for an independent homeland in the north and east of Sri Lanka. It might seem like the mood among Tamils has shifted in the months following Dissanayake’s victory, as the NPP swept to power across all the districts in the Tamil homeland in November’s parliamentary elections. Tamil scholar Mario Arulthas argues , however, that this is not symbolic of the death of Tamil nationalism, but rather a hope for a better economy and a frustration with Tamil politicians. And, he points out, Dissanayake’s government has continued to arrest Tamils for participating in memorialisation events for their civil war dead—reneging on election promises and suggesting a continuation of the status quo. Local government elections held in early May showed a swing away from Dissanayake’s NPP alliance once again. Dissanayake’s government is failing to meet election promises made to more groups than just Tamil voters. Dissanayake initially promised to renegotiate the bailout deal Sri Lanka struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under Wickremesinghe, which led to widespread austerity measures that affected the poorest Sri Lankans the most. Dissanayake has since backtracked , claiming the economy “cannot take the slightest shock”. Although the mood in Sri Lanka is hopeful a few months into AKD’s presidency, the working class is yet to be fully convinced. Little has changed in the country’s cost of living, with the poorest citizens facing yet another year of eking out a living. Dissanayake’s government has shown some sympathy, raising minimum wages by TK percent or amount—but it remains to be seen how far these changes will reach. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full bloom (Anatomy) (2022), oil on canvas. Gundasa’s wife was one of the many voters who spoiled her ballot. Ahead of the election, she was emotional as she explained that, as a young person, she was unable to get a job despite completing her education—a fate her children are also experiencing. Her 22-year-old daughter is unable to get a job or afford private education in Sri Lanka, while, the couple says, the children of wealthy politicians are studying at private universities abroad. “I am not voting for anyone,” she says, adding, “that’s my policy.” Corruption and the economy were the backbone of Sri Lanka’s 2024 vote, which represented a landmark shift in the country’s politics. Although Dissanayake’s promises to create a Sri Lanka that treats all its citizens equally still remain far-off goals, particularly for the country’s poorest and minority communities, his first six months in office have so far shown a willingness to shake up the status quo. “I am not a magician, I am a common citizen,” Dissanayake said as he took oath as the president of Sri Lanka. Perhaps those words were said with an awareness that the common citizens of Sri Lanka have power beyond what anybody had previously imagined—power to dismantle the ruling class and put their faith in a man who might just change it all. As for whether he really will, only time will tell. If he doesn’t, the citizens will surely have something to say. Sujeewa Kumari Weerasinghe, Full Bloom (Anatomy iii) (2022), oil on canvas. SUB-HEAD Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Reportage Colombo Tamil Sri Lanka Indian & Sri Lankan Tamil Communities Sinhala Nationalism Sri Lankan Civil War Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna National People’s Power alliance Marxist insurrection NPP Democracy Leftist Economic Crisis Poverty Impoverished Histories Sajith Premadasa Dissanayake Dissent Minority Anura Kumara Dissanayake Ranil Wickremasinghe Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Aragalaya Mario Arulthas Discrimination Post-Aragalaya Moment Thirteenth Amendment Genocide Militarism Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. You can update and reuse text themes. 16th Jul 2025 AUTHOR · AUTHOR Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Add paragraph text. Click “Edit Text” to customize this theme across your site. 1 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 5 Heading 6 Heading 6 Heading 6 On That Note: